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ABSTRACT: It is commonplace to think of an island as a discreetly bounded unit. Selected 
writings on islands by the poststructuralist philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida 
reveal the island variously to be both real and imaginary, mythological and scientific, but as 
most problematic when constituted in political terms as an indivisible, sovereign entity. These 
two thinkers’ more broadly developed concepts of the virtual and the impossible, respectively, 
are seen to disrupt any assumptions about the fixity and closure of the island polity. Instead 
they emphasize its actualization through processual relations that can be difficult yet dynamic 
and  decisive  in  effecting  the  move  from  being  to  becoming-other.  As  the  possibilities  for 
instituting more ethical as well as different political relations open up, the question of island 
studies remaining in its currently coherent, familiar form is raised for consideration. 
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Introduction 
 
The  island’s  presumed  unity  follows  its  physical  geography  as  a  body  of  land  in 
contradistinction  to  surrounding  waters.  Thus  there  is  a  common  conception  (or  rather 
misconception) with the pictorial representation of islands erring towards a perfect, totalizing 
circumscription of space: 
 
Ask anyone to take a sheet of paper and to draw an island as seen from the air. Most 
likely, that person would draw a stylized image of a piece of land, without much detail 
other than being surrounded by water. It would fit within the space confines of the 
sheet. It would also, uncannily, have an approximately circular shape. (Baldacchino, 
2005: 247) 
 
Of course, we know that the reality is far more complicated. Islands can be marshy, tidal, 
peninsular or bridged; yet others are caught somewhere between being rocky outcrops or islets 
and serving alternatively as mainlands (for other islands) as well as continents; and questions 
arising around matters of size and remoteness extend then to definitions of isolation, insularity 
and  islandness  (Baldacchino,  2007;  Bradshaw  &  Williams,  1999;  Royle,  2001;  Steinberg, 
2005; Steinberg, 2009; Williams, 2010). This journal is itself replete with cases demonstrating 
the  complexity  of  islands  as  they  range  between  closure  and  openness,  interiority  and 
exteriority, singular fixity and diasporic multiplicity. But, as these cases also reveal, islands 
(and not least those qualities contributing to what gets described as islandness) exist inside the S. Williams 
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tight mental frameworks of our mind as much as in the messy reality of our concrete worlds 
(Baldacchino,  2006;  Hay,  2006).  They  are  also  constituted  in  relational  terms  through  a 
political as well as geographical imaginary. 
 
Discussing islands as “objects of representation”, Baldacchino notes how a person at arrival 
either  on  or  near  an  island  “…experiences  early  on  a  craving  to  circumnavigate, 
circumambulate or climb its highest point and take it all in” (2005: 247). Herein lies a point 
well  worth  drawing  out.  It  is  only  through  being  viewed,  surveyed,  or  mapped  (directly 
through embodied practice or in the mind’s eye) that such a place ever gets to be defined and 
categorized as a particular type of object, as an island, and objectified as such; and likewise, it 
is only with some realization and hence planning and preparation as well as management of the 
time spent there that people recognize themselves as subject to or subjects of an island, and 
thus as islanders as such. This intimate relationship between people and place is constitutive of 
its terms, situating objects and subjects in time and space as the island and its islanders are 
cleaved together (and subsequently connected to others elsewhere). It is intensely political, too. 
 
Thinking of an island in political terms, constituted as an island polity, is offered here as a 
means to elucidate its contradictory nature. Questions of identity and sovereignty, which have 
been little explored in relation to the ontological and epistemological status of islands, are 
especially pressing here. Poststructuralist philosophers, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida, in 
addressing the politics of being and becoming, have made insightful contributions referring 
specifically  to  islands.  Such  references  can  appear  to  have  been  made  mostly  in  passing. 
However, the central concerns of Deleuze and Derrida, such as the assumptions made about the 
unified meaning of any one text or the solid empirical basis for a nation-state’s coherence are 
reflected in many ways in the problematic of the island polity. These authors’ writings on 
islands have not as yet been collated or reviewed in any comprehensive manner, and so are 
brought here together for introduction to island studies scholars. Although they were written in 
a context and for purposes not directly concerning islands, their value in providing a much 
needed  theoretical  perspective  on  islands  and  island  studies  will  be  demonstrated.  These 
writings are linked to the broader work of Deleuze and Derrida before then being examined in 
turn and with respect to island studies scholarship.  
 
Deleuze and Derrida have each produced a body of work that is explicitly political in its own 
unique way; and yet whilst quite different, there are significant synergies (Beardsworth, 1996; 
Patton, 2000; Patton & Protevi, 2003). As poststructuralists they both challenge the claims 
inherent in any objective or positivist structure but one major line of fracture and variation 
between  them  contrasts  their  respective  lines  of  thought  as  immanent  versus  transcendent 
(Smith, 2003). The distinction holds in as much as Derrida works inside (and away at) the 
representational frame of epistemology whilst Deleuze engages with the productive material of 
ontology. Still, the difference between them can be striking: “It is the difference between No 
and Yes” (Bearn, 2000: 441). Their thinking can sometimes be at cross-purposes, but drawing 
on Deleuze and Derrida together is not wholly unthinkable. It also suits the doubly difficult 
nature of the subject matter at hand here. Indeed, these two thinkers can be harnessed alongside 
each other very successfully because, as will be demonstrated, their respective notions of the 
virtual  and  the  impossible  are  conceptualizations  central  to  their  oeuvres;  together,  they 
provide excellent tools for prising open our very particular problematic of the island polity.                                     Deleuze, Derrida and the Political Problem of Islands & Island Studies 
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Deleuze: The Virtual Opening of Island Territory 
 
Gilles  Deleuze  produced  –  often  with  co-author  Félix  Guattari  –  some  of  the  twentieth 
century’s most spatially nuanced philosophy. With the concepts of smooth and striated space, 
the  nomadic  and  sedentary,  and  de-  and  re-territorialization,  Deleuze  sees  everything  as 
emergent,  taking  place  on  a  plane  of  immanence  through  processes  of  connection  and 
becoming which he organizes conceptually in terms of layers described as geological strata and 
multiple  plateaus  (Deleuze  &  Guattari,  1987;  also  Bonta  &  Protevi,  2004;  Buchanan  & 
Lambert, 2005; Doel, 2000). Much of Deleuze’s work focuses on the problems of the state as a 
territorial machine and repressive apparatus that encodes power amidst the global flows of 
capitalism. He therefore analyses such matters in relation to a universal history through which 
the world’s concrete social formations have repeatedly, yet every time differently, unfolded 
across the earth’s surface.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s working together culminates in questions they ask of “geo-philosophy” 
in their final book What is Philosophy? (1994). Their interrogation of the earth and its peoples 
follows  particular  moments  and  milieus  including  the  Ancient  Greek  city  and  the  modern 
nation-state as providing opportunities for our becoming truly democratic. It is conducted by 
them apparently with “good reason” not least because “…the problem of the State-Form of 
Sovereignty has been one of the most difficult questions to resolve historically” (Lambert, 
2005: 223). This state entity has a parallel or overlain form in the island polity. Deleuze’s 
references  to  islands  are  thus  hinted  at  here  as  the  spaces  of  the  city-state  are  shown  as 
dynamic: “The man of capitalism is not Robinson but Ulysses, the cunning plebeian, some 
average man or other living in the big towns, Autochthonous Proletarians or foreign Migrants 
who throw themselves into infinite movement – revolution” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 98). 
 
In their own Nietzschean manner, Deleuze and Guattari have together created new concepts in 
an explicitly political and “untimely” act of calling forth “…a new earth, a new people” (1994: 
99 emphasis in original). These concepts exist as pure events or singularities indeterminately 
related  to  others,  but  they  are  also,  as  incorporeal  transformations  expressed  in  language, 
attributed to bodies and states of affairs. So, beyond just representing the world, they intervene 
in  it.  As  explained  more  deeply  in  Difference  and  Repetition  (1994),  Deleuze  sees  such 
repetitions as therefore  producing difference rather than simply  reproducing sameness. His 
interest  is  with  difference  in  itself  contra  those  representations  or  simulacra  based  on  the 
Platonic model of identification with the One or Same.  
 
Alternatively, Deleuze draws on the concept of a virtual multiplicity which he first developed 
in Bergsonism (1988). Here, he shifts focus from the extensive to intensive nature of things, 
from their spatial distribution to temporal duration. His interest moves away from numbers and 
space, which are infinitely divisible and yet will still always produce only more of the same, 
towards what are qualitative, non-numeric multiplicities that change in kind with their division. 
Deleuze discusses light, sound and temperature as examples. Such intensive differences result 
from the dynamic, self-organization of material and energy that comprises the virtual “in such 
a way that it is actualized by being differenciated and is forced to differenciate itself, to create 
its lines of differenciation in order to be actualised” (Deleuze, 1988: 97). Importantly, this field S. Williams 
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of virtuality and its actualization far exceed any simple realization of the possible (with the 
latter being quite different since necessarily limited to a set of predefined forms). 
 
Deserted Islands 
 
Deleuze’s concepts are never simply to be applied (for example, to islands as things to be 
studied). Instead, they provide us with a way into thinking about our world’s emergence on a 
plane  of  immanence.  Islands  in  the  Deleuzean  corpus  are  seen  not  so  much  as  empirical 
phenomena  for  examination  as  ideas  opening  into  thought.  The  key  text  dedicated  to  this 
subject  matter  –  an  early  essay  first  published  in  the  1950s  “Causes  et  raisons  des  îles 
désertes” now in translation as “Desert islands” (Deleuze, 2004) – therefore concerns islands 
as imaginary and mythological as well as real but above all as creative irruptions. The essay 
starts with a simple observation:  
 
Geographers say there are two kinds of islands. This is valuable information for the 
imagination because it confirms what the imagination already knew. Nor is it the only 
case where science makes mythology more concrete, and mythology makes science more 
vivid.  Continental  islands  are  accidental,  derived  islands.  …  Oceanic  islands  are 
originary, essential islands. … These two kinds of islands, continental and originary, 
reveal a profound opposition between ocean and land. (Deleuze, 2004: 9 emphasis in 
original) 
 
An elemental conflict arises with Deleuze’s observations on the island as he comments on it 
emerging from between sea and earth, gendered as mother or father, isolated or connected, 
populous or deserted. Rather than opt for any one state over another, however, he explores the 
relations of force and intensity that are encountered simultaneously in terms of a geological 
earth science and human, cosmographic spirituality. Deleuze affords a key role to the Platonic 
Idea as much as the thing-in-itself. Thus he sees “the double movement that produces islands in 
themselves”  in  terms  of  psychogenesis,  creating  an  island  as  “…the  origin,  radical  and 
absolute” (Deleuze, 2004: 10 emphasis in original).  
 
Although physical geography and creative imagination are collapsed together in Deleuzean 
thought, the latter prevails. It is the idea of an island that is most forceful. Through processes of 
separation and recreation, an island is produced materially as people approach it from outside 
and reproduce its originary or derived creation. The subject/object distinction is eroded in this 
imagining of an island. Or, as one reading of the essay suggests: “The island, like whoever 
desires it, is of a conscience unto itself … being at the same time of the perceiver and the 
perceived alike” (Conley, 2005: 212). Deleuze’s island as a deserted isle likewise remains 
deserted even when inhabited. It can contain a desert as might a continent, but there is also a 
desert outside of the island in the form of the surrounding sea that envelops it as an egg. In this 
sense, the desert island is at the very centre of life and fecundity.  
 
Still, the dominant theme of the island for Deleuze (2004: 13) “is not production of life … but 
its reproduction” and thus as a “second origin … more essential than the first, since it gives us 
the law of repetition, the law of the series, whose first origin only gave us moments.” It is the 
myth of the world beginning anew:                                     Deleuze, Derrida and the Political Problem of Islands & Island Studies 
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Here we see original creation caught in a re-creation, which is concentrated in a holy land 
in the middle of the ocean. This second origin of the world is more important than the 
first: it is a sacred island. Many myths recount that what we find there is an egg, a cosmic 
egg. Since the island is a second origin, it is entrusted to man and not the gods (Deleuze, 
2004: 13). 
 
But these myths, according to Deleuze, have died and since been replaced by the bourgeois, 
secular values evinced in such classic literature as Giraudoux’s Suzanne and the Pacific (1975 
[1921]) and Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1900 [1719]). Therefore, the protagonists in both tales 
are deprived of partners in any meaningful sort of relationship, and each instead engages with 
“cadavers” or “a slave”, respectively, in their reproduction of what Deleuze considers was 
becoming or had become (there in Europe as well as the island) a familiar but banal, bourgeois 
political economy.  
 
As a repetition of the same, neither the island depicted in such tales, nor in its potential for 
novelty and difference, is fully realized there or elsewhere. In its virtual multiplicity, however, 
the island is no longer a fixed point in time and space, nor is it simply a historical, literary or 
cartographic representation. Instead, it is emergent as an intensely powerful singularity, both 
material and conceptual, caught on a wave of becoming as it continually gets assembled and 
then re-assembled ever differently in becoming-other. The island constantly changes, unfolding 
and refolding on a line of flight in all directions across the surface of the globe. 
 
Other Islands 
 
Islands are often taken to embody absolute security, fixity and closure, identified with the 
sameness of an assumed interiority and insularity, but for Deleuze they exemplify becoming-
other  since  constituted  through  the  outside  and  open  to  difference.  Therefore,  they  are 
discussed at length by him in a later essay, and again with reference to Defoe’s Robinson 
Crusoe or rather another fictional iteration of that tale about a deserted island. Through the 
chapter-long meditation ‘Michel Tournier and the world without others’ in his book The Logic 
of Sense, Deleuze (1990: 331-321) engages with Tournier’s re-telling of the Robinsonade as 
the story of Friday on the island of Speranza. It is a fascinating story used by Deleuze to 
explore how otherness functions (or not) to structure the world:  
 
With  Tournier,  Deleuze  seeks  the  effects  of  the  presence  of  other  people  in  our 
everyday world, in order to conclude what Otherness is, and also what it would be like 
to live without other people. (Boundas, 1994: 110) 
 
As  Tournier’s  narrative  unfolds,  Robinson  is  not  returned  to  civilization  but  is  instead 
progressively  dehumanized.  Robinson  hovers  between  states  of  neurosis  and  psychosis, 
succumbing to the earth as he curls up his body in the lush greenery and submerges himself in 
the muddy wallow, or alternatively rises upward through the airy skies to merge with the sun 
and light. Ultimately though, he loses his own sense of identity as he and the island and all its 
denizens are rendered up irreversibly to the elements in a movement that eventually sees them 
consumed in a massive conflagration.  S. Williams 
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The isle is as much the hero of the novel as Robinson or Friday. It changes shape in the 
course of a series of divisions, no less than Robinson himself changes his form in the 
course of a series of metamorphoses. Robinson’s subjective series is inseparable from the 
series of states of the island. (Deleuze, 1990: 302) 
 
Deleuze  notes  how  in  Defoe’s  tale  Robinson  returns  to  the  ship  to  gather  materials  for 
replicating a strict order of work whereas with Tournier there is no such reproduction. Rather 
than seek an equivalent economic reality based on a return to the origin, and hence an existence 
without sexuality, Tournier’s Robinson lives in a purely material and libidinal desert island 
economy where he will ultimately become one with the island and engulfed by its great sexual 
as well as cosmic  energy.  In this tale of ends  rather than origins, suggests Deleuze, is an 
implicit deviation and perversity. Robinson’s relationship with Friday was always going to be 
ambiguous (having initially tried on meeting to shoot him but missing). Now tied together in 
the struggle for material survival, they still must deviate in relation to any prescribed ends. In 
fact, describing Friday as “identified with Venus” and “myself feminine and the bride of the 
sky”, Robinson states: “The truth is that at the height to which Friday  and  I have soared, 
difference  of  sex  is  left  behind”  (Tournier,  cited  in  Deleuze,  1990:  304).  Their  individual 
identities have collapsed together in this event of pure intensity. Robinson and Friday are no 
longer  distinct  in  the  process  of  their  mutual  dissolution.  Indeed,  the  de-subjectivization 
resulting here is what embodies the perversity that is the island of Speranza. According to 
Tournier, such de-subjectivization defines perversion specifically as the failure to apprehend 
others as Other. 
 
However,  Tournier’s  story  is  more  than  a  thesis  on  perversion  as  it  deeply  explores  this 
absence of others. Notably, Deleuze explains that by ‘others’ is meant here not just subjects or 
objects but rather their necessary structuring relative to each other in any number of perceptual 
fields and hence their possible actualization of a world. As Robinson realizes, a world without 
others is one without possibilities, neither past nor future, and starkly limited by necessity: 
 
What happens when Others are missing from the structure of the world? In that case, 
there reigns alone the brutal opposition of the sun and the earth, of an unbearable light 
and  an  obscure  abyss:  the  “summary  law  of  all  or  nothing.”  The  known  and  the 
unknown, the perceived and the unperceived confront one another absolutely in a battle 
with nuances. “My vision of the island is reduced to that of my own eyes, and what I do 
not see of it is to me a total unknown. Everywhere I am not total darkness reigns.” A 
harsh and black world, without potentialities or virtualities: the category of the possible 
has collapsed. Instead of relatively harmonious forms surging forth from, and going back 
to, a background in accordance with an order of space and time, only abstract lines now 
exist,  luminous  and  harmful  –  only  a  groundless  abyss,  rebellious  and  devouring. 
Nothing but Elements (Deleuze, 1990: 306). 
 
In a world without others one is unable to distinguish self from other or to recognize subjects 
and objects as such relative to each other in time and space. They are wholly Other, absolute 
and singular, arising as elemental doubles and surface images at the horizon between earth and 
sky, arrived at through some deviation – a detour obtained through catastrophe.                                      Deleuze, Derrida and the Political Problem of Islands & Island Studies 
 
 
221
 
The world’s virtuality is not mere abstraction. Rather, it exists in all the possibilities of the 
world irrespective of whether they already are or might ever be realized (or not) and so is 
always there as part of what can then get actualized. It can exist in reality and potentially as an 
island which gets imagined and enacted as a state, territory, polity or economy, for example. 
However, “it does not exist (actually) outside of that which expresses it” or, as Deleuze (1990: 
307) further explains: 
 
It implicates it, it envelops it as something else, in a kind of torsion which situates what 
is expressed in the expressing. When I, in turn and for my part, grasp the reality of what 
the Other was expressing, I do nothing but explicate the Other, as I develop and realize 
the  corresponding  possible  world.  It  is  true  that  the  Other  already  bestows  a  certain 
reality on the possibilities which he encompasses – especially by speaking. The other is 
the existence of the encompassed possible. Language is the reality of the possible as 
such. The self is the development and the explication of what is possible, the process of 
its realization in the actual. 
 
For  Deleuze,  this  relationship  of  otherness  is  critical  to  the  constitution  of  any  identity, 
including subjects and objects, self and other, thereby contributing to the possible worlds they 
create.  In this case, various islands and island phenomena come into being through forces 
experienced either from inside or out. The island identities most lastingly captured by Defoe in 
the personae of Robinson and Friday therefore cannot help but be transformed through the 
intense relationship that follows their meeting and as reworked by others such as Tournier. 
These (otherwise insular) entities are caught between land and sea, impelled in an interminable 
line of flight to the horizon, open to all elements and possibilities.  
 
Deleuze was enamoured by the Nietzschean roll of the dice whereas Derrida is deemed more of 
a pessimist (Bearn, 2000). Therefore, in the guise of an island studies scholar, Deleuze might 
quite happily cast himself adrift so as to be able then to explore unhindered, in life-affirming 
manner,  any  prospects  for  re-territorialization.  On  the  other  hand,  Derrida  (1995:  27-28) 
mentions islands as places of retirement, return and a retreat into the past: “If I had to retire to 
an island, it would be particularly history books, memoirs, that I would doubtless take with me, 
and that I would read in my own way, perhaps to make literature out of them, unless it would 
be the other way round, and this would be true for other books (art, philosophy, religion, 
human or natural sciences, law, etc.).” However, any such round of negation or closure offered 
by Derrida, especially if taken as implying impossibility, deserves a closer reading. 
 
Derrida: The Impossible Closure of Island Sovereignty 
 
The  island  polity’s  problematization  is  amenable  to  a  Derridean  interpretation  given  that 
Derrida’s project was a radical interrogation of the philosophical underpinnings of Western 
culture. Recurrent themes concern matters of writing, representation, law and justice but the 
later  work  exhibits  an  increasingly  overt  politicization  with  an  emphasis  on  questions  of 
statehood, sovereignty and democracy. Likewise, his longstanding project of deconstruction 
based  on  the  notions  of  différance,  supplement,  trace  and  pharmakon  is  attended  by  the 
ongoing development of his ideas of impossibility and undecidability grounded in the aporos S. Williams 
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or aporia. Deconstruction implies the deferral of meaning as well as its proliferation, and hints 
at Derrida’s temporal or historical as well as geographical leaning. The spatial is still relevant 
(including  in  terms  of  textual  positions  and  margins),  but  best  understood  in  terms  of  his 
thinking on space and spacing described as “the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time 
of space” (Derrida, 1982: 13).  
 
Unlike Deleuze’s tendency to  follow a hundred lines of flight in all their vitality, Derrida 
focuses on the one iteration as it gets framed in terms of absence and death as well as the 
endless deferral of any one full and final meaning. His space and spacing run up against limits, 
borders and boundaries, certainly, as he has a passion for the impossible, but there is also that 
which  never  arrives  (such  as  the  perfectly  idealized,  transcendent  objectives  of  justice  or 
democracy). In Aporias (1993) Derrida compares the aporos to a border, threshold, doorway or 
passage that is impossibly difficult, seemingly impracticable and yet never totally closed. It is, 
he says, “the impossible passage, the refused, denied, or prohibited passage, indeed the non-
passage, which can in fact be something else, the event of a coming or of a future advent which 
no longer has the form of the movement that consists in passing, traversing, or transiting” 
(Derrida, 1993: 8).  
 
The impasse as impossibility not only represents constraint because it is also what precedes the 
possibility of a judgment or decision. The impossible thereby offers passage or an opportunity 
to advance (even if ending reason and choice because, as a de-cision, it “cuts off” and moves 
away from any further thought or alternative course of action on the matter). It reaches beyond 
universal  forms  of  standard  reasoning  too,  as  the  impossible  demands  more  than  just  a 
calculation where the results can be known in advance. The impossible, as aporetic, demands 
an ethical response from us in selecting only one out of several equally justifiable solutions:  
 
[I]f you don’t experience some undecidability, then the decision would simply be the 
application of a program, the consequences of a premiss or of a matrix. So a decision 
has to go through some impossibility in order for it to be a decision … Ethics and 
politics therefore start with undecidability (Derrida, 1999: 66). 
 
Derrida  therefore  progresses  his  broader  ethico-political  inquiry  with  references  made  on 
several occasions to the aporetic figure of the island. 
 
Islands Unbound 
 
Derrida has described the contentious spaces of law courts, temples and sanctuaries as well as 
borders and thresholds as aporetic places marking the sacred from the profane, for example, in 
“Force of law” (1990), “Beyond the law” (1992a) and “Faith and knowledge” (2002a). It is in 
the latter long essay, first delivered as Foi et savoir, and now known in its more developed 
form and translation as “Faith and knowledge: the two sources of Religion at the limits of 
reason alone” (Derrida, 2002a), that Derrida refers to “the island” along with “the Promised 
Land” and “the desert” as three most impossible places. The resistance to any mapping or 
passage  is  intimated  here  as  he  describes  the  impossibility  of  moving  across  such  terrain. 
“Three aporetical places: with no way out or an assured path, without itinerary or point of                                     Deleuze, Derrida and the Political Problem of Islands & Island Studies 
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arrival,  without  an  exterior  with  a  predictable  map  and  a  calculable  program”  (Derrida, 
2002a: 47 emphasis in original). 
 
That islands appear throughout “Faith and knowledge” is unsurprising as Derrida was at the 
time attending a roundtable discussion (with Gadamer and Vattimo in 1994) on the Isle of 
Capri  in  Italy.  The  event  concerned  religion’s  resurrection,  ultimately  referring  to  Islam’s 
presence  in  the  modern  world,  but  it  commenced  with  Derrida  discussing  Christianity 
alongside his more familiar motifs of truth, life, death, sacrifice and violence. He uses the 
setting to good effect, enfolded within the ancient world, and refers to other islands including 
Patmos  where  John  reputedly  commenced  his  writing  the  Book  of  Revelations,  and  Delos 
which  was  sacred  as  the  home  to  deities  including  Artemis,  Dionysus  and  Ariadne  and 
Apollo’s birthplace. But, this figure of the island subtends much more than just a place of 
religion and history, and Derrida’s work likewise has multiple undercurrents.  
 
The island embodies those same difficulties configuring any entity identified in terms of being 
and belonging as self, community, state and/or territory when it faces absolute otherness at the 
limits of representation. Therefore, in “Faith and knowledge”, after he has problematized the 
approach to any talk on the sensitive topic of religion (which is so frequently and too simply 
cast in black and white terms), we see Derrida deciding “to situate such arguments, limit them 
in time and space” yet he immediately then goes about setting them loose: 
 
Date: 28 February 1994. Place: an island, the isle of Capri. A hotel, a table around 
which  we  speak  among  friends,  almost  without  any  order,  without  agenda,  without 
order of the day, no watchword [mot d’ordre] save for a single word, the clearest and 
most obscure: religion. We believe we can pretend to believe – fiduciary act – that we 
share in some pre-understanding… Well – we will have to return to this much later – 
nothing is less pre-assured than such a Faktum… and the entire question of religion 
comes down, perhaps, to this lack of assurance…  
 
I  had  at  first  proposed  to  bring  to  the  light  of  day  of  reflection,  misconstruing  or 
denying it as little as possible, an effective and unique situation – that in which we then 
found ourselves:… a double proposition… raised a double question: of language and of 
nation…  an  idiom  that  is  above  all  inseparable  from  the  social  nexus,  from  the 
political, familial, ethnic, communitarian nexus, from the nation and from the people: 
from  autochthony,  blood  and  soil,  and  from  the  ever  more  problematic  relation  to 
citizenship and to the state… 
 
We are not far from Rome, but are no longer in Rome. Here we are literally isolated for 
two days, insulated on the heights of Capri, in the difference between the Roman and 
the Italic… Here, then, is a given whose figure at least, as limit, remains contingent and 
significant at the same time (Derrida, 2002a: 43-45 emphasis in original). 
 
His contradictory, paradoxical words hint at a deconstructive différance, which has long been 
at the heart of the Derridean corpus and continues to bleed outwards. Here we find intimations 
of a community bound by shared belief and understanding with an onto-theological basis as 
well as grounding in blood and soil. But there is that familiar problem – so explicitly manifest S. Williams 
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with an island polity – in its double bind of seeming to be quite clearly defined yet resisting 
any final, authoritative representation.  
 
These matters had earlier been raised by Derrida in relation to the impossibility of aporias 
when introducing the book of that same name. No exterior or foundational reality (nothing 
outside the text or its context) can ground such abyssal relations. He therefore emphasises the 
importance of representation, with language co-implicated in the inevitable contamination and 
indeterminacy of such phenomena: 
 
…belonging to a language does not compare, at first sight, with inclusion in the space of 
citizenship,  or  nationality;  natural,  historical,  or  political  borders;  geography  or  geo-
politics; soil, blood, or social class. As soon as these totalities are over-determined, or 
rather contaminated, by the events of language … they, in turn, are no longer thoroughly 
what  they  are  or  what  one  thinks  they  are,  that  is,  they  are  no  longer  identical  to 
themselves, hence no longer simply identifiable and to that extent no longer determinable 
(Derrida, 1993: 7 emphasis in original). 
 
The impossibility of the island polity is similar to that of any nation, state or territory claiming 
sovereignty or what Derrida examines in and as “Declarations of independence” (2002b). This 
performative speech act brings about the event it names in constituting “we the people” but its 
iteration necessarily fails in trying so succinctly to represent democracy, for example, which as 
such  must  remain  open  to  all,  including  those  members  yet  to  be  counted.  Any  claim  to 
sovereignty  is  enabled  by  the  enunciation  and  signature  of  a  proper  name  that  lives  on, 
surviving its subjects and objects, standing in for them in their absence and thus announcing 
the arrival of their death. In fact, the usual reference back to God then countersigns a freedom 
and independence which is not theirs alone but rather “sovereignty without sovereignty” (de 
Ville, 2008). 
 
Only Islands 
 
It is apposite that the internal contamination and ultimate undermining of any state, community 
or  polity  by  its  own  autoimmunity  is  also  present  amongst  the  islands  deconstructed  by 
Derrida.  Whilst  arguing  for  their  impossibility,  islands  are  more  than  possible.  In  fact, 
according to a later paper, it seems for him that there is nothing in our world(s) but islands. 
 
In one of his seminars of 2002-03, lecturing on the Heideggerian concepts of world, infinity 
and solitude, Derrida made his most profound link to islands when, like Deleuze, he referred to 
Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. These seminar papers were made available to his friend, literary 
critic J. Hillis Miller, who has since relayed Derrida’s surprising philosophical assertion that 
each of the species, all men and women, every subjectivity, community and culture (and by 
implication polity or state) exists without any connection or communion amongst the different 
worlds of one other. It is a remarkable passage discussed by the critic in two papers (Miller, 
2007a; 2007b) and since then by geographers, including myself in the context of island studies 
(Williams, 2010; also Wylie, 2009). The passage is worth citing at length: 
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“Neither animals of different species, nor men of different cultures, nor any individual, 
animal or human, inhabits the same world as another, however close and similar these 
living individuals may be (humans or animals), and the difference from one world to 
the other will remain forever uncrossable, the community of the world being always 
constructed, simulated by  a group of stabilizing positions [dispositifs], more or less 
stable, therefore also never natural, language in the  broad sense, codes of traces being 
destined, with all the living, to construct a unity of the world always deconstructible 
and nowhere and never given in nature. Between my world, the “my world”; what I call 
“my world,” and there is no other for me, every other world making up part of it, 
between my world and every other world, there is initially the space and the time of an 
infinite difference, of an interruption incommensurable with all the attempts at passage, 
of bridge, of isthmus, of communication, of translation, of trope, and of transfer which 
the desire for a world and the sickness of the world [mal du monde], and the being in 
sickness of the world [l”être en mal de monde] will attempt to pose, to impose, to 
propose, to stabilize. There is no world, there are only islands.”  (Derrida, cited in 
Miller, 2007a: 265-266) 
 
Derrida’s emphatic return to islands is perhaps unusual given the more common descriptions of 
today’s world as one of encounters with others, open to difference, and networked in the ebb 
and  flow  of  international  relations  and  a  global  political  economy.  A  proliferating 
connectedness rather than singular isolation is what characterizes the excesses of dissemination 
as well as much of today’s geopolitics. Whilst it is the European Union that Derrida discusses 
in The Other Heading (1992b: 29), he advocates a polity “that consists precisely in not closing 
itself off in its own identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it is not, 
toward the other heading or the heading of the other … the beyond of this modern tradition, 
another border structure, another shore.”  Such a polity, like an island, can choose between 
isolation or connectedness but in either case it establishes identity through the differentiation of 
otherness. 
 
The propensity for any one community, nation, state or territory to become insular in “closing 
itself off in its own identity” is especially pronounced on islands. However, we often see them 
being drawn outwards by the forces of globalization as well as inwards through secessionist or 
isolationist movements. Furthermore, the tendency for internal friction and rupture is present in 
most  political  entities  and  not  just  islands.  It  is  identified  by  Derrida  in  terms  of  his 
conceptualization of “auto-immunity” used to explain how an immune or defence system turns 
against itself (with terrorist deployments against the U.S., for example, relying on those same 
communications,  transport  and  military  technologies  designed,  built  and  used  inside  that 
nation). In “Faith and Knowledge”, Derrida (2002a: 87) describes it as an “excess above and 
beyond  the  living  …  what  opens  the  space  of  death”  but  most  tellingly  talks  of  “…no 
community  that  would  not  cultivate  its  own  auto-immunity,  a  principle  of  sacrificial  self-
destruction ruining the principle of self-protection (that of maintaining its self-integrity intact), 
and this in view of some sort of invisible and spectral sur-vival.” His notion of auto-immunity 
embraces  the  necessity  of  being  open  to  otherness  in  our  always  living-on  towards  death 
(Williams and Hay, 2011).  
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Derrida’s declaration that there are only islands, in this context, reveals his own well-reasoned 
refusal to belong but also primarily as the best means for engagement. An Algerian Jew as well 
as Frenchman, he was insistent in saying “I am not one of the family” and “don’t count me in” 
to signal an independence that he deemed of critical importance. As he explained in dialogue 
with Maurizio Ferraris: 
 
… I want to keep my freedom, always: this, for me, is the condition not only for being 
singular and other, but also for entering into relation with the singularity and alterity of 
others. When someone is one of the family, not only does he lose himself in the herd, but 
he loses the others as well; the others become simply places, family functions, or places 
or functions in the organic totality that constitutes a group, school, nation or community 
of subjects speaking the same language (Derrida & Ferraris, 2001: 27). 
 
The  impossibility  of  attaining  any  insularity  or  closure  around  the  various  entities  of 
subjectivity and community implies the necessary inverse in their openness to the other. But an 
ethical  response  demands  our  recognition  of  them  also  simply  on  their  own  terms.  In  the 
context of this paper, it is in terms more precisely of their being in, on or of islands, even if it is 
perhaps only as islands within islands and amongst many others in a world of islands. Any 
final decision on the absolute sovereignty of an island will ultimately always be impossible (as 
it is for all matters of identity and territoriality).  
 
Discussion: Virtually Impossible Endings and Ethical Beginnings 
 
The idea of an island has been examined here through the lens of poststructuralist philosophy. 
Firstly, understood as a Deleuzean becoming, it is seen expressed through the geographical 
relations and constant flux of de- and re-territorialization. Secondly, understood as a Derridean 
interpretation  it  is  seen  in  terms  of  historical  narration  as  both  representing  and  being 
represented. Aided by these two bodies of poststructuralist thought, we can appreciate how the 
island as an emergent thing is realized through the words and actions of its political subjects 
and objects as part of a community or polity. The indivisibility and sovereignty that are thus 
afforded island peoples and places are momentary and prone to fracture and change despite the 
proclamations of a unity harking back to a mythical past or anticipating a time still yet to come 
(often aligned with a precise physical geography as well as the destiny if not history of a 
shared culture and kinship). 
 
An island’s ethical constitution has also been intimated and so warrants further reflection here. 
Thinking  via  Deleuze,  we  can  consider  an  event  that  materializes  change  in  terms  of 
annexation, occupation, secession, division or dissolution, for example, as a potentially ethical 
as well as productively political moment. A Deleuzean ethic would thus ask what any one 
particular manifestation of the island polity might now be capable of (in its becoming-other, 
with this or that de/re-territorialization).  
 
Deleuze’s work – including that written with Guattari and following Spinoza – has encouraged 
others  to  pursue  similar  lines  of  inquiry,  for  example,  in  asking:  “What  can  a  body  do?” 
(Buchanan, 1997: 73). Such thinking focuses on the body constituted as an assemblage with 
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too  about  the  community  and  autoimmunity  as  well  as  an  island  polity’s  ethical  effects 
understood as Deleuzean differenciation or political intensity. In this context, an island is much 
more  than  just  a  discreet  unit  of  land  made  distinct  by  the  water  surrounding  it.  Indeed, 
islandness is constituted through relationships of difference, including those that arise between 
a body of land and a body of water, but differentiation is not bound to fixity or limited by 
containment. Rather, it is the potential for always becoming-other that is immanent to these 
bodies:  
 
We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its 
affects are, how they can or cannot enter into a composition with other affects, with the 
affects of another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to 
exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful 
body (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 257). 
 
Conversely,  Derrida  might  well  have  us  pursue  the  difficult  lines  of  reason,  decision  and 
delimitation hence negation (but then, perhaps, also de-negation). With a Derridean ethical 
inflection we would thus ponder the island polity as traced in the outlines of its unfolding 
(irrespective  of  whether  a  story  of  arrival  or  deferral,  anticipating  democratic  freedom  or 
lapsing into totalitarianism). Still, it too coheres, albeit only ever temporarily, as an entity that 
resists  any  one  final  representation  or  total  disclosure.  The  island  is  momentarily  insular, 
distanced and detached in its excessiveness as well as in its inadequacy. As Miller, discussing 
Derrida as “enisled” and referring to a citation from “Faith and knowledge”, states: 
 
Every community, whether it wants to be or not, however much it tries to enclose itself 
in itself, is open to “the other, the future, death, freedom, the coming or the love of the 
other,  the  space  and  time  of  a  spectralizing  messianicity  beyond  all  messianism 
(Derrida, cited by Miller, 2007a: 271). 
 
Any individual subject, political community or area of practice represented by one essential, 
enduring  form  is  necessarily  problematic  –  no  matter  how  timely  its  narration,  precise  in 
spatial delimitation, nor seemingly right in its ethical inclusions or extension. The inevitable 
presence of the other understood as the constitutive outside is attended by promises (usually 
unspoken) of difference, change and hence demise. In light of writings by Deleuze as well as 
Derrida, this dynamic is productive as much as negative and driven from within as well as 
without. Such are the endless possibilities and secrets of islands (Bradshaw & Williams, 1999; 
Williams, 2010). 
 
There is one last point to be made in this discussion. Whilst focussing on islands we might also 
touch  on  the  matter  of  island  studies  as  a  coherently  defined  field  of  research.  Its  remit, 
according to Baldacchino (2007), extends to such diverse places and multiple forms as human 
physiology  (the  islets  of  Langerhans)  and  western  domestic  interiors  (island  benches  in 
kitchens), and notes how planet Earth is often likened to an island but in itself also comprises a 
world  of  islands.  Likewise,  it  seems,  island  studies  is  a  disciplinary  and  methodological 
cornucopia and perhaps impossibly so as almost anything as much as everything goes here 
(Baldacchino, 2008). It still is constituted as a bounded field of research and practice – if only 
through  being  named  as  such  –  but  its  limitations  are  internal  as  much  as  external. S. Williams 
  228
Contradictions or what Hay (2006) identifies as fissures can therefore be observed as fracturing 
island studies and causing possible weakness (unless opened up and explored in productive 
ways). 
 
An array of self-proclaimed island scholars and others (myself included) have variously spoken 
and written island studies into existence. However, as the critical mass now formed through 
these efforts revolves around an international hub of leading academics and key publications, 
some  of  us  might  be  well  advised  to  look  back  again  to  the  margins  or  periphery.  The 
difference  and  otherness  of  islands  in  all  their  number  and  variety  are  what  has  always 
grounded island studies. There is a paradox therefore in their unification so as to create the one 
distinctly coherent body of work that is island studies. However, it seems here (from reading 
Derrida and Deleuze) that the subjects and objects of this discreet field may never constitute 
any properly definitive entity. Instead, it will likely continue in various ways to suffer internal 
complications but also escape the frame of reference and combine with what lies outside and 
beyond. These inherent failings and irruptive excesses precede island studies’ own dissolution 
but could also deliver its ongoing reinvention.  
 
Of course,  good island studies scholarship has already commenced such reflexive, internal 
critique. Hence several leading island scholars have continued to engage in robust debate as 
well as to call attention to the sophisticated nuances and complexity that holds here (see, for 
example, Baldacchino, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008; Hay, 2006; Stratford, 2003; Stratford et al., 
2011). They are not in agreement though: Hay (2006), for example, urges a return to dealing 
with  ‘real’  not  metaphoric  islands.  Still,  these  scholars  have  identified  the  need  for  more 
adequate  theorization  of  our  field  with  its  extensive  and  alluring  but  also  elusive  content. 
Literary scholars have similarly commented on  our existence in a hybridized world where 
‘every island (ethnicity, nation and the like) is but a fragment of the whole that is always 
already in the process of transforming the particular into something other than its (original, 
essential) self’ (Bongie, 1998: 18). Likewise, Fletcher reiterates others’ views on island studies 
still  having  ‘some  distance  to  go’  as  she  sees  need  for  a  more  sophisticated  conceptual 
framework which might be found in performative geography:  
 
The  benefits  of  this  approach  are  potentially  manifold:  it  begins  with  an 
acknowledgement of the mutually constructive relationship of description of islands (in 
multiple media) and their material and social reality; it provides a fresh conceptual 
model  for  considering  islands  as  productive  of  individual  and  social  identity;  and, 
perhaps most importantly, it insists that islands are always already places in process 
(Fletcher, 2011: 30). 
 
This  paper’s  offering  a  Deleuzo-Derridean  conceptualization  of  islands  and  island  studies 
provides another such theorization but one with an explicitly political poststructuralist bent. 
Amidst these musings then, and from a more practical perspective, one might therefore wonder 
whether or not island studies has really started to embrace its full potential. Instead, it is yet to 
be  cut  loose  from  the  stays  of  our  still  very  traditional,  academic  moorings  (anchored  to 
structures derived over the millennia from our western philosophical paradigm). Consider, for 
example, Baldacchino’s (2006, 2007) emphasis on scholarly publication, postgraduate courses,                                     Deleuze, Derrida and the Political Problem of Islands & Island Studies 
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and citation metrics and ranking processes which afford a recognition that is perhaps really 
valued only at or near the centre. 
 
In noting such contradictions, this paper invites further reflection on the virtual impossibility of 
island studies as well as that of islands per se. Key here is the ethical inflection which has us 
ask what is it that island studies has internalised with its delimitation as such? And to what 
effect, or with what exclusions? We might therefore inquire into its constitutive outside and the 
prospect for engaging in different relationships or the need perhaps as well as the possibilities 
for islands and island studies to be otherwise. What will happen as island studies scholarship 
resists the metropolitan academy with all its particular, professorial practices? What about if or 
when the ideas, activities and interests of everyday island peoples are truly engaged with and 
more supportively launched (and are perhaps driving island studies)? These sorts of questions 
might challenge many scholars and seem destructive as they pose some end or finality here. 
However,  they  are  precisely  what  might  also  permit  a  more  empowering  and  productive, 
specifically  archipelagic  efflorescence  rather  than  island  studies.  It  has,  for  example,  been 
through  addressing  the  limitations  of  insularity  (interpreted  as  isolation,  backwardness, 
constraint and decline) that island scholarship has already pushed and crossed many boundaries 
as it makes and re-makes itself anew. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Together with Deleuze and Derrida, we have encountered the island in relating differences that 
are  internal  and  external,  immanent  and  transcendent.  An  island  is  constituted  through  its 
proclamations and performances as a political entity that is mythological and scientific, real 
and imaginary; so, whilst often founded on some theological as well as empirical basis, it also 
gets  situated  in  a  particular  space  and  time.  The  repetition  and  reiteration  of  such 
representations and enactments create a multiplicity of worlds that are explored here, and best 
understood, in terms of the virtual and the impossible. Indeed, islands and our studies of them 
are brought into being through processes of becoming (rather than just being) which then also 
render them virtually impossible.  
 
The  virtually  impossible  is  a  concept  assembled  here  from  Derridean  deconstruction  and 
Deleuzean affirmation. It draws together two lines of poststructuralist thought which have most 
often been left counterpoised. With  additional space we could consider ways to integrate more 
fully the work of these two authors. Still, it suffices here to note how they are productive foils 
for each other as their writings on islands reinforce the use of each other’s work in the context 
of island studies and resonate with the most significant ideas drawn from their philosophical 
legacies.  As  a  result,  island  scholars  will  hopefully  be  inspired  and  rewarded  by  further 
exploring the oeuvres of Deleuze and Derrida in efforts to progress our field’s development. 
Here, the island is already deemed an awkwardly complex entity, but viewed through their 
poststructural theory it is problematized in the political terms of an indivisible sovereignty. 
Deleuzean virtuality and Derridean impossibility used together provide ways to move forward 
but with all the ambivalences and contradictions (and possibilities) of islandness kept in play. 
Hence there is no need to favour either the ideal over the material or openness over closure 
when  engaging  with  the  problematic  of  the  island  polity  because  a  Deleuzo-Derridean 
interpretation  permits  both  negation  and  affirmation,  though  never  simply  dialectical  nor S. Williams 
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additive. The virtually impossible entails all the possibilities of actualization in this or any 
other world. It therefore marshals inevitabilities to come (even though they may not yet have 
been anticipated) as well as undecidable junctures and moments of occlusion that comprise 
seemingly impassable points in time and space (including those long since past). 
 
Islands embody the virtually impossible. They have long been associated with representations 
of fixity and bounded containment that are often purposefully retained but also now challenged 
and shifted, for example, in the field of island studies. Claims to stasis or insularity still find 
parallels in the political calls for absolute sovereignty as well as the attendant faith in those 
territorial delimitations which seem to be making a comeback in the face of our current era’s 
characteristic globalising forces of deracination, placelessness and flow. It seems clear from 
this study, however, that in marking out these identifications in terms of a self-sameness or 
one-ness, such an entity is necessarily also then articulated with its other (understood as the 
wholly Other). Subsequently, whilst these entities – in this case, islands and island phenomena 
– are being realized as identical with themselves, they are at the same time actually made 
available  for  becoming  otherwise.  They  can  and  possibly  must  therefore  continue  to  look 
outwards whilst still also reflecting inwardly. Such a stance has become the norm with much 
island studies scholarship but it deserves re-statement here not least because it flags inevitable 
and ineffable changes (which often remain unacknowledged or discussed) and intimates how 
they might best be faced. 
 
In our poststructuralist critique, this recursive movement arises from a combined reading of 
Deleuze and Derrida. One’s pessimism and the other’s optimism sit well together with the 
many ambiguities and contradictions of islands but also lead into an intriguing political double-
play around island studies. Islands and island phenomena, and likewise our studies of them, are 
constituted inside and out by many peoples and places, each absolutely singular and individual. 
Whilst resisting our representations of them, their engagement is critical, and it is with such 
island peoples and places that we remain responsible for extending ethical relations without 
end. This realization is terminal though, as it smacks of death as well as life. The death knell is 
sounded for the more traditional ideas that abound about islands and perhaps likewise for our 
thinking of them as encompassed by island studies in its currently familiar form. Yet, if we do 
encounter the demise of island studies in its current form, we need not fear, resist or simply 
mourn its passing. Celebration is warranted too, as new beginnings as well as endings inhere in 
an always immanent becoming-other. Thus might we cry: Island Studies is dead. Long live the 
study of islands! 
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